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  • PoolCritter
    I've decided to put up a photo album to share the TeamCarr pictures with. We take hundreds a week but only keep a few. If you were in NATCA between 2000 and 2006 you helped raise, encourage and tolerate my daughter and triplets, and for that I am very grateful. While some did not like the personal information I provided then I have had most of them killed so this should be a safe haven now. Enjoy!
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« March 2006 | Main | May 2006 »

April 30, 2006

How To Alientate New Employees By Rick Day

How To Alienate New Employees
By ATO VP Rick Day
as told to FAA Academy Student X

Yesterday, our training instructor at the FAA Academy told us that our training was going to be cut for the day so we could accommodate an  “Executive Briefing” from the Vice President of Oceanic. As we started the briefing today, the MMAC director introduced Mr. Rick Day as being a model to follow because if we worked hard, we could reach his level and accomplishments.

Mr. Day then started to outline things that were very obvious to us such as, being on time, that we have multiple benefits in the FAA, how we have all of these HR problem resolution programs available. Then he started to outline how important it was to do our jobs and not to expect to go to our facilities to start saying that we don’t want to work mids, weekends, midshifts and how training in the FAA and deteriorating facilities were keeping him up at night.

During the briefing he interrupted to bring up examples of operational errors that have occurred and proceeded to give us an outline on how a pilot passed 8 sectors in Atlanta without any controller issuing an active SIGMET which caused the pilot to have an accident. “We need to be accountable!”, he said.  “This is an embarrassment to me and everyone in here, and it will not be tolerated!”  Then Day said, “You will be held accountable!” He said this in an almost-scolding-a-five-year-old tone to everyone in the auditorium. Most of the folks in the auditorium were Academy instructors and the future controllers that are, per Mr. Day’s words, “hand picked” to perform and become the future of Air Traffic Control in the FAA. He kept stating that we need to respect everyone and our fellow co-workers and we need to be on time to work over and over again.

Then he went on to discuss the controller pay topic. After completing his brief on the vague description of the FAA intentions of slashing controller pay and saying that “the mission comes first”, right after saying almost verbatim “I had a very rewarding and lucrative career, with a good home, putting kids through college”, he went to say that we will have to make some sacrifices to get to where we need to go in the agency.

As the moment arose for him to start taking questions one young CTI grad asked that if controllers were going to sacrifice their salaries, was management willing to take a pay cut? His answer, "YES! Management is taking a paycut, we will be closing management positions and realigning personnel, so my answer is Yes, management is taking a pay cut!", Mr. Day answered.

Many other questions were asked, only with vague answers from Mr. Day. But what stood out was the question from another CTI grad that asked him why the controllers were supposed to be more productive, handle more aircraft and get paid less? And Mr. Day replied to him and the entire auditorium verbatim as follows: “Well if you don’t like it then don’t take the job!  You can leave!"

All of us training in the FAA Academy had to curve our radar problems and tower training for this outstanding fraud, waste and abuse (because we gained nothing but dislike for our employer at such an early stage.)  We suffered a cut in our very essential training to see the Vice President of Oceanic rage against a workforce that is not more than 3 months old into the FAA system, hoping to graduate and have a professional career in a good field.

I am in awe and disgust, probably worse that my peers were. I am new to the FAA ATC career and I am stunned at how this "high level" individual, that reports to agency administrators and relates to our representatives in Washington D.C., has very much told the entire auditorium full of new hires and trainees that “if they didn’t like it, don’t take the job”. This is the FAA motto and greeting message that the Vice President of Oceanic in the FAA flew from Washington D.C. to deliver to us.  He also told us that he needed to interact more with the work force.

Everyone that I spoke with afterwards felt anger for having sacrificed our training time to hear the new motto for the future of the FAA. How can this abuse be stopped?

Sincerely,

FAA Academy Student X

April 29, 2006

Good Cyphering

The FAA may have made a tactical error in creating the Collegiate Training Initiative Program.  Now, instead of stoneheaded trainees like I was, the air traffic system is slowly being infused with them-there college grad-u-ates.  These kids know their cyphering, their letters and everything.  They aren't dummies, and they aren't lemmings, either.  They are smart, sharp, well spoken and well read, and they know the difference between chicken salad and chicken something-else. 

I've been getting quite a few letters from these men and women, and their concern not only for themselves but for their chosen profession is palpable in every word.  Here's a recent sample:

"Mr. Carr, 

As an aspiring Air Traffic Controller, I have been closely monitoring the now terminated contract negotiations between the FAA and NATCA.  The unions website has been an excellent source of information about this process.  When the website posted documentation from NATCAs briefing of Congress, I immediately downloaded and examined the file for myself.    

I was interested to learn that, prior to renegotiation of controller compensation in the late 1990s, controllers at facilities with ratings of 10, 11, and 12 were paid as GS-14s.  This system was abandoned to alleviate the pay compression that failed to differentiate compensation between the varying workloads experienced by unique facilities.  With these facts in mind, I did a little research on the GS pay scale. 

Should the FAAs proposed contract take effect, a new controller at a facility with a  level 10 rating would earn between $62,750 and $85,600 annually in base pay.  Had the compensation system not been overhauled during the Clinton years, and the status quo remained, these individuals would still be making GS-14 pay.  The current pay band for GS-14s ranges between $77,793 and $101,130.  Beginning at the bottom of the pay band, a newly minted Certified Professional Controller at a level 10 facility will make $15,043 LESS every year under the current FAA proposal than they would if pay had remained on the GS scale. 

This new proposal equates to about a 20% reduction in pay from an outmoded system that was universally agreed to be unfair.   NATCA has already pointed out how Academy students are being paid at a fraction of the historical rate.  In addition, should the FAAs proposal go through, Academy graduates would also see a dramatic reduction in pay from the traditional GS-9 rate.  The example above examines base pay upon achieving CPC status. This is more than a realignment of base pay; this is a drastic pay cut that leaves controllers compensated (adjusted for inflation) at lower rate than at any previous time.       

Much has been made of the sweetheart deal that allowed controllers salaries to grow rapidly over the past 7 years.  The FAA claims to simply be putting the brakes on a runaway pay juggernaut.  In reality, the cuts are much deeper.  For new controllers, the gains made in the previous 7 years have been undone, and then some.   My thanks to NATCA for fighting for those whose voices cannot yet be heard.

Signed,

An aspiring controller"

April 28, 2006

FAA Contract Submission Explained

The FAA recently conducted a detailed briefing on Capitol Hill to explain their contract proposal.  They invited staffers from both parties to attend and review comprehensive formulas concerning the agency's last best offer on pay for new hires and existing controllers.

NATCA was able to sneak a video camera into this highly technical presentation, and here is what we discovered: 

Download FAA_Contract.mwv.wmv

April 25, 2006

United 93

Good evening.  I am in New York City for the worldwide premiere of the movie “United 93” at the Tribeca Film Festival.  I was invited by one of the producers who NATCA worked with on some of the technical aspects regarding the depiction of air traffic control in the production.

Today was a brilliant, crisp blue day in New York, the kind of day that always reminds me of the 11th no matter where I am.  I always look skyward on mornings like this one and think, “Damn.”  This evening promises to be difficult, as the families of the victims, the first responders, the movie makers, the press and others all gather for the screening. 

The movie is billed as a tribute of sorts to the brave men and women on that flight, ordinary citizens who banded together to strike the first blow in the war on terror.  In the movie pilots serve as actors for the pilots, flight attendants serve as actresses for the flight attendants, controllers are controllers, and Ben Sliney, the man who shut down the National Airspace System on 9-11, plays himself.  The families of the victims all endorsed and supported the production, providing the moviemakers with their loved one’s style of dress, choice of snack and other personal details that allowed for a representation of the events as they unfolded.  I am told that every detail was painstakingly recreated to the best of the director’s ability, right down to the magazines in the seat pockets on the doomed airplane.

I said in my speech at the dedication of a UAL93 Memorial at Cleveland Center several years ago, when those passengers ran up that aisle towards the cockpit, the only fear on that airplane was in the hearts of the cowards…the hijackers themselves.   

I was in New York two Tuesdays before Tuesday, 9-11-01, and I was in New York two Tuesdays after 9-11-01, when the wreckage still smoldered and burned.  The recovery had turned to removal and lower Manhattan resembled a war zone, covered in a thick, acrid pall of death.  Water trucks followed every convoy of wreckage as it left the site, watering down the West Side highway to keep the idle, the curious and the opportunistic from sweeping up “Trade Center dust” to sell on E-Bay.  I visited the Pentagon later that week, and the field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania where United 93 came to earth that week as well.  I had to go.  I had to see with my own eyes what those maniacs had wrought. 

Everyone in aviation was uniquely wounded by the events of that awful morning, and air traffic controllers are no exception.  In fact, in some ways, the cognitive dissonance those events caused still reverberates through the profession, in ways seen and unseen, and still aches the hearts of those who hold the safety of the system as their sacred trust.  Tonight I am honored to represent the working men and women of our nation’s air traffic control system at the premiere of this movie.  I’ll let you know how it goes in a future blog. 

April 24, 2006

Elmo's World

If you are a regular watcher of Sesame Street you are familiar with "Elmo's World."  Elmo's World is a cozy little place, crayoned in bright primary colors and so simple and easy to absorb even Dorothy the fish can understand what is happening. 

Except, of course, when Elmo sings, "One of these things is not like the other!"  It is a cute guessing game where something has gone awry or some object is clearly out of place with it's surroundings.  To honor our furry red puppet friend, the Main Bang will play "One of these things is not like the other" with you today.  See if you can figure out which of these things is not like the other.....

"If there were an opportunity to go back to the table...we'd certainly like to sit down and talk."  Marion Blakey, FAA Administrator, 4/11/06, C-SPAN National telecast

"I do expect to send NATCA an invitation to come back to the table at some point to discuss these issues even though we are at impasse..."  Rick Durcharme, FAA ATO Negotiator, 4/17/06, faama Newsletter

"There is no invitation out there to return to the table..."  FAA Spokesman, 4/19/06, Aviation Daily

April 22, 2006

Speaking Of Letters.....

April 21, 2006

ORIGINAL VIA COURIER - COPIES VIA FACSIMILE AND OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

The Honorable Marion C. Blakey, Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Room 1010
Washington DC   20591

Subject:  Formal Request To Resume Negotiations

Dear Administrator Blakey:

On behalf of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, I write today to express NATCA's strong belief that, despite the Federal Aviation Administration's actions on April 5, a voluntary labor agreement between NATCA and the Agency covering the air traffic controllers unit and two other units represented by NATCA remains desirable and achievable and, more importantly, in the best interests of the Agency, its represented workforce, and the flying public that they serve. This letter, therefore, constitutes NATCA's formal request that the FAA return to the bargaining table to resume negotiations with NATCA for a voluntary agreement.

Because NATCA believed that progress was being made in the mediated negotiations that took place in March 2006, it was with dismay and confusion that NATCA received the Agency's declaration of impasse on April 5.  From the onset of negotiations and continuing through April 5, NATCA was committed to expending every effort possible in its attempt to reach a voluntary agreement with the Agency and therefore considered the Agency's declaration of impasse -  after only nine months of substantive negotiations and considerable progress during mediation -  to be both premature and unnecessary.  NATCA remains committed to expending every possible effort to achieve a voluntary agreement and believes that such an agreement remains within the grasp of the parties.  In order to make a voluntary agreement a reality (or at least to be able to say with all conviction and honesty that every possible effort was expended by all parties), NATCA invites the Agency to return to full and active participation in the collective bargaining process by returning to the table.  NATCA stands ready to offer a revised economic proposal in an attempt to facilitate attainment of a voluntary agreement and would welcome the opportunity to explore terms and conditions that would meet the Agency's needs.

It is NATCA's sincere hope that the Agency will demonstrate the integrity to the process that the dedicated professionals who work for it deserve and rejoin NATCA in negotiations for a voluntary agreement. I look forward to your immediate response to the request expressed herein and to working with you and your representatives in pursuit of an agreement that will establish fair and equitable terms and conditions of employment for the Agency's employees, meet the Agency's needs for fiscal and professional accountability, and demonstrates to the flying public that employer and employees are united in their commitment to providing the highest level of service.

Sincerely,

John S. Carr
President

April 21, 2006

S.W.A.K.

The FAA air traffic supcom posse held a telcon yesterday afternoon to brief the higher skill set regarding the ongoing contract impasse.  It was mysterious and eerie, like London in a dense fog.  A streetlight flickered...a dog barked….an ATIS played…I think I even heard the plaintive, mournful wail of a freighter’s foghorn.  What I DIDN’T hear was much worth reporting about, so I’ll turn to Viewer Mail for this installment of the Bang.   

I’ve gotten a ton of Viewer Mail recently.  The three letters which follow are typical of the sentiments I am hearing and reading expressed by the air traffic control workforce.  The correspondence I receive generally falls into one of a couple of categories:  complaints about the deteriorating condition of our facilities, complaints regarding being treated like garbage by our employer, and farewell letters from members who are heading for the exits.  Here’s a sample:

“Since February of last year (14 months), me and my predecessors have been trying to obtain chairs for the cafeteria here at ZZZ. We are now down to 27 chairs and the facility has no money to buy new ones. In a building with over 400 employees, it has become standing room only in the cafeteria during lunch. Yet in October of last year the facility spent 30k on "supplies," including new chairs, for the training department in anticipation of a wave of new hires.  Unfortunately, we now hear this number of new hires is dwindling with the budget cuts.

Today, our second employee in a month was injured when chair number 28 gave out on him and after filling out reams of required paperwork, he had to leave the facility and go to the clinic for a back injury.

Controller X”

“Part of me wears "rose glasses" and wants to believe everyone wants to do the "right thing" for everyone else.  I've lived in the DC area since 1973, I should realize by now what a circus this town is!!!!

It kills me to think I have 16 months left until retirement and this is the environment that I am ending my career in.  I still remember my first day at MMAC in June 1983 and the pride I felt when I took the Oath.  I really felt part of something special, doing something of great value for our country.  I remember arriving back home  almost 3 months later, getting the biggest hugs from my wife and my 4 year old daughter.  I remember my son was 8 months old when I left, and had grown leaps and bounds in 3 months.  I remember him looking at me with such suspicion: Who is this strange man? 

I remember how that tore at my heart.  And through the years, all of the lost holidays, weekends, and other special events that daddy couldn't make it to because he had an important job to do.

If I had known 23 years ago that my job, my career, me, would be spit upon with such disrespect by my boss and my President I would never have taken this job and lost all of that precious time.  I had been working a good job in sales, making a good salary with a good future in a huge company.  But my dad was career Navy senior master chief (or as he liked to say, "God") and I wanted to serve my country, too.  I felt pride and honor.  I felt that I had a chance to be half the man my father made himself into. 

And up until Bush came into office, I still felt that way.  But you can thank Ms. Blakey for me, for ruining this agency and for trashing all of the sacrifices I and everyone else have made over our careers.

Had I know this is how it would end I would have opened up my own public relations firm.  That way I could have made some REAL money and had a much more healthful career!!!  Take care.  And if you are ever roaming around Leesburg with nothing to do, give me a call and I'd be honored to buy you a Starbucks!

Controller Y”

“I'm a PATCO controller, working at XYZ.  Through most of the NATCA/FAA negotiations, I've sat back and put up with little or no news about where things (like my family's future) are headed. No more.  I'm putting in my retirement papers within a couple days. I still can't even get straight answers about my retirement options---The FAA  won't even compute my military retirement payback amount, so maybe I'll lose six years of military service computations.

We work short on almost every shift. Rather than open up a handoff or split the combined positions, a new supervisor will sit down and screw up our data tags trying to help. While everyone in my area agrees that we're getting screwed, no one wants to speak up.

Our Facility Manager was led to the gate last week carrying a box of her personal mementos, apparently fired for falsifying her time and attendance records after spending the last 3 years telling us we needed to be more accountable for our time. Our new boss, Mr. XXXXX, wasted no time in telling us that due to "medical reasons", newly fired Manager YYYYY would be “away.” 

Maybe you know best, maybe you have an ace up your sleeve, something, I don't know.  But I'm leaving.   I've been there before, John. It never gets pretty.

Controller Z”

April 20, 2006

File This Away

A recent article in the Chicago Tribune detailed the $100 million dollar legal cost of United Airline’s bankruptcy.  A few alert Main Bangers found it especially interesting in light of the current imbroglio concerning controller’s salaries.

A 24 year veteran air traffic controller from Chicago Center wrote me to describe some of the legal fees that United paid out.  Apparently, there were more than 300 attorneys used on the bankruptcy filing, billing almost 197,000 hours at rates that ranged from $225 to $850 an hour. 

Another 66,000 hours were billed by legal assistants, law clerks and other paraprofessionals at rates of $75 to $245 an hour.

What does that mean?  That means that the absolute lowest hourly rate paid by United Airlines to the greenest paralegal working on their case exceeds the hourly rate paid to a 24 year veteran air traffic controller at one of the busiest facilities in the world.  Get yourself a law clerk and file that away for future reference.
 

April 18, 2006

Eroding Public Safety

The agency late last week presented our NATCA Engineers Team a "high-level" briefing on the FAA's new Safety Management System (SMS).  Our representatives took detailed notes during this meeting for several reasons.  First and foremost, we believe the agency's actions will ultimately put the flying public at risk, and we feel a deep obligation to try to prevent that from happening.  NATCA's engineers believe SMS is a significant change to the current gold standard in aircraft certification, parts of the program are incomplete, some of it is Illegal, and it might ultimately lead to a decreasing margin of safety in our national airspace system.

Starting as early as next week, the agency will start formal meetings with our engineers and members.  We have asked our folks to attend, ask questions, and take detailed notes on the agency's plans.  So far the agency's briefings have been part road show, part medicine man and part intimidation.  They want our people to shut up and take the Nike way out---"Just Do It."  That's not going to fly for us.  NATCA is urging employees to use their voices to point out the pitfalls and problems associated with SMS.

We are beginning our formal response to SMS.  NATCA's initial reaction to SMS is that SMS will abdicate our ability to oversee aviation manufacturers, and it will erode our ability to oversee aviation safety designees, as well.  Just recently, the FAA granted Boeing the ability to DOA-approve "new TC" aircraft.  We feel this is absurd and illegal.  Our engineers think the regulations do not support this warped interpretation, and they have memorialized this with the agency.  We are creating a robust paper trail which we hope never gets seen, unlike the paper trail which eventually became the CAIB.

NATCA is constantly looking for input not only on SMS, but on how we can improve the current safety system.  Our current system has delivered the lowest accident rate.  Our current system is not broken nor does it need to be scrapped.  We know that our engineers and their co-workers toil daily to keep the flying public safe.  I humbly thank them for their dedication and service.  I know the work they do today and every day keeps the system safe, and I know our members know what it takes to do the job right.  It is dissapointing to see the agency working to throw that all away.

Here is a listing of the detailed questions we asked at a recent SMS Briefing given by management, and the evasive, incomplete and uncertain answers received to these critical, safety-related questions:

SMS-initial briefing-NATCA questions and Agency responses  4/7/06

Slide 1 “AIR Safety Management System Overview”

NATCA Questions: - After hearing the whole presentation, we voiced concerns over the lack of any examples that would support a case for changing the current system. 
- We also asked for examples of “gaps” in the current certification/safety system, so we could understand what the agency was trying to change.
- We also requested to be part of any teams put together to develop changes in our working environment.

Agency response: …had no response, questions were too detailed, no orders/policies/regs have been identified yet…

Slide 3 “What Is Our Job?”

NATCA Questions: - We voiced concerns that the agency had failed to denote the key day-to-day functions of certification, findings of compliance, accident and service difficulty investigations, Airworthiness Directives, etc…Why?
-We asked the agency to clarify what “risks” were they trying to mitigate?

Agency response: …had no response, questions were too detailed, no orders/policies/regs have been identified yet…

Slide 4 “AIR SMS Vision”
NATCA Questions: - “Systems Approach”??  Don’t we already have that today via FARs, Orders, Policies, etc.? 
-When did management drop the ball on these safety items?

Agency response: …had no response, questions were too detailed, no orders/policies/regs have been identified yet…

Slide 5 “How Does Safety Management Help Us Improve?”

NATCA Questions: - What safety management are they referring to?
-Understand what “risk” better?  What don’t we understand now that management is concerned about?
-Why aren’t there any specific items discussed?

Agency response: …had no response, questions were too detailed, no orders/policies/regs have been identified yet…

Slide 7 “What does our Safety Management System Look Like?”

NATCA Questions – Is this pyramid your visions of what you are going to develop?
-NATCA doesn’t view QMS as being effectively implemented (and in some cases, it’s not been implemented).  Is the agency interested in putting together a joint team with NATCA to make QMS work?
-If the safety culture is the base/foundation of the pyramid, why is the System Safety Approach going to drive “down” change?  What’s wrong with our present “Safety Culture” that has created the lowest/safest aircraft accident rate in history?

Agency response: …we “need” to change the culture by driving down change to support it, no response to the fact we have the lowest/safest aircraft accident rate…basically non-answers and “this is a high level review”…

Slide 15 “What are some Attributes of a System Safety Approach?”

NATCA Questions – We are vary concerned with the terms/non-descriptive concepts of “Discretionary Authority, Risk Assessment Tools, Action Validation, and Risk-based Approach”.  When will these be defined?

Agency response:…no orders or policies have been changed to address these, “this is a high level review”…

Slide 18 compared to Slide 19 (aka “Current System” vs “Future AIR System”)

These questions & responses were for the “Current System”:
NATCA Questions – What examples of “gaps” can be provided?
- Where are the “Industry gaps” like failure to provide data, inadequate data, “last minute” notification of changes in type design during a certification program, etc…

Agency response: …a gap can be like when there might have been a certification standard developed that didn’t also address operations
…this slide is only looking at the FAA/internal view

These questions & responses were for the “Future AIR System”:
NATCA Questions – Where are the pictorial representations of “Data & Info” like there were in the current system?

Agency response: …hopefully this system will allow us/FAA to look at more data…

Slide 22 “1. Standards in the SMS”
NATCA Questions – “Focus”?  What aren’t we doing today?
- Will this take away from the engineer’s ability today to question any area of concern?
- Where are the details on what are the “highest risk areas”?
- When have we not facilitated the implementation of new technologies to advance safety?

Agency response: …”this is a high level of review”…

Slide 23 “2. Certification in the SMS”

– The agency verbally described an applicant’s system as requiring a “design” system.  We/NATCA clarified that there is no law that mandates the need for a design system, so it would be illegal to mandate this.  The agency verbally stated they needed to review this with Legal.
- We noted that several organizational delegations currently have engineering systems that we oversee.  The agency verbally stated that the “design” system is different than a delegation’s system.
- “Pre-Qualification requirements?” We clarified that this would be illegal to implement since the current law does not mandate this.  It is also “anti-free market.”   This will negatively hinder a majority of new, small, and mid-size aviation businesses.

Slide 24 “Example of Changes in Certification”

NATCA : We commented that all the examples under the column heading “Future with SMS” will be huge/significant changes in our current working environment and responsibilities

Agency response: …no specifics have been developed yet…

Slide 25 “3. Continued Operational Safety in the SMS”

NATCA Question: What are “Standardized risk management methodologies”?

Agency response: …some early work has been done by Directorates, but nothing worth discussing/integrating…no processes have been developed…

Slide 26 “4. Production in the SMS”

NATCA Questions: - What specifically needs to be “improved” concerning Engineering and Manufacturing working together?  Certification Management is an inherently manufacturing function.
-NATCA is opposed to any system/process/procedure that prevents us from looking at type design

Agency response: ……had no response, questions were too detailed…

Slide 27 “5. Delegation Decisions in the SMS”

NATCA – Allowing “Applicant Showing Only” Is Illegal!!

Agency response: …they are looking into that…

Slide 28 “ 6. Use of CFR Prioritization in Delegation”
This has three areas of discussion:

Cube diagram under heading of “Today”
-The agency clarified that there is NO Applicant Showing today.  The line was to split the cube into two sections identified as “FAA Finding” vs “Delegated with FAA ad hoc review of data”

Cube diagram under headings of “Tomorrow” and “SMS”
-The two lines split the cube into three sections.  The lowest section in the cube had no description.  We/NATCA questioned if this was a “gap”.  The agency identified it as a “some data would be allowed to be approved as Applicant Showing Only.”  We reminded them that is Illegal.

Cube diagram under headings of “Tomorrow” and “CDO (with SMS)”
-The CDO is part of FAA Reauthorization and the law states that the FAA is to show a plan to Congress in 2007 and is to be implemented in 2008.  The agency said that there is discussion for this to be pushed back.
-We questioned if the term “showing” meant that the applicant would actually do any certification work.
-The agency said that the FAA should be allowed to audit records.  We felt this was reactive and that the FAA may only be allowed to do this only after an accident…we felt their interpretation puts the public at risk

Slide 30 “8. Designee Management in the SMS”

-NATCA is clearly opposed to any prioritization of CFRs and is opposed to any restrictions to the current FAA methodologies of engineering review and oversight.  WE ARE OPPOSED TO ABDICATION.
-We/NATCA do not see the GAO’s findings & recommendations in regards to Designee Oversight being specifically addressed.  The agency had no details of how it was addressing the GAO’s report.

Slide 32 “10. SMS and Our Work with Industry”

-We/NATCA do not see SMS going down the path of being proactive
-We reminded the agency that pre-qualification is illegal.  The agency said they may be looking at Part 21 and it may not apply to all applicants---creating a two-tier system of certification and aircraft safety.

April 16, 2006

Now Batting For Wally Pipp

On June 2, 1925, Wally Pipp told the New York Yankees manager that he needed to sit out that day's game with a headache.  That headache would become the most expensive aspirins in sports history, forever engraving Wally's name in the pantheon of also-rans.  You see, Wally was replaced by a rookie by the name of Lou "Iron Horse" Gehrig, who went on to play sixteen seasons with the pinstripes, setting a consecutive-games record that stood for seven decades, playing in seven World Series and winning six, and becoming a six time All Star and two time AL MVP.

Today I am turning over the Main Bang to Doug Wicker from El Paso.  Doug is a published author in his own right, and penned the following blog to give me the day off.  First, thanks for that, and second...it reads like a modern day Pipp-Gehrig tale, with Doug in the role of Lou and me in the role of Wally!  Don't forget me, dear readers, even though Doug is a great writer and I've got a headache........

And now...without further ado...... 

The Colin Chapman Theory of
Air Traffic Control Redesign

“Simplicate, then add lightness”
—— Anthony Colin Bruce Chapman, Founder Lotus Cars
On how to build a successful sports car

There is in the world of the sports car enthusiast a humorous tale of questionable veracity relating Colin Chapman’s development of the now legendary Lotus Seven, a car renown for its incredibly light weigh——somewhere around 1,000 to 1,200 pounds depending on the drive train used and the odd option or two available.  To put that in perspective, today’s average street machine weighs three times as much.  And if a large SUV is more your style, then you’re trundling about town in something that weighs as much as six Lotus Sevens.

The story goes something like this:  In preparation for the Lotus Seven Series 2, Colin Chapman was obsessed with further lightening the already remarkably low weight of the Lotus Seven S1.  The stressed monocoque body of the Seven was attached to a delicate framework of hollow tubes, and these tubes represented the bulk of the available reducible weight for this vehicle.  So, Chapman began removing from an unclad Seven frame one tube after another.  At some point, the frame snapped in two.  Satisfied that he had finally found the limits to weight reduction, Chapman reinserted the last tube removed, proclaimed victory in his war over weight, and instructed his company to start churning out the newer, lighter S2.

By now you, my dear reader, are asking, “What the HECK does this have to do with Air Traffic Control, and why the HECK do I care?”

You care because the current FAA Administrator and her management team are today performing a very similar experiment.  They are removing small snippets of support structure from the framework of your Air Traffic Control System——a controller slot here, a redundant piece of telecommunications equipment there, a preventative maintenance procedure no one will miss… right up until the point where that equipment fails, an expensive T1 connection that feeds a signal from a distant radar site that is of no use to the facility receiving it… that is, until their primary radar system fails and the understaffed control room is left scrambling in their attempts to pry apart aircraft that are hurtling toward each other at incredible high rates of speed.

Colin Chapman performed his weight-saving exercise on a stationary object.  When that structure failed, no one was endangered.

FAA management is performing their cost-saving exercise on a dynamic system responsible for untold lives, not to mention an industry that accounts for over 10% of the GNP of this country.  It’s as if they were removing hollow tubes from a Lotus Seven traveling at 500 miles per hour, with oncoming traffic in the same lane.  Most people would call that, “Insane.”  FAA management calls it, “A sound business decision using long-established cost-cutting principles.”

The latest cost-saving experiment is to see how much the agency can cut the pay, either overtly or through inflation, of a controller workforce, 70% of which will be eligible to retire over the next five years.  These controllers will be faced with the following choice:  Stay and watch their paycheck erode through inflation, or retire and receive annual cost-of-living adjustments every January for the rest of their lives.  Controllers aren’t stupid; they know which choice makes more sense for them and their families, regardless of assurances from the Administrator to the contrary.

Since we began this article with a quote from Colin Chapman, it is only fitting that we end it with yet another.

“You won't catch me driving a race car that I have built”
—— Anthony Colin Bruce Chapman, Founder Lotus Cars
In a tongue-in-cheek witticism of the dangers inherent in racing light-weight vehicles

Inevitably at some point the Administrator and her management team are going to find the breaking point of an already overstressed Air Traffic System.  It leaves one to wonder when they do, will they be saying:

“You won’t catch me flying in a system I have dismantled.”