The agency late last week presented our NATCA Engineers Team a "high-level" briefing on the FAA's new Safety Management System (SMS). Our representatives took detailed notes during this meeting for several reasons. First and foremost, we believe the agency's actions will ultimately put the flying public at risk, and we feel a deep obligation to try to prevent that from happening. NATCA's engineers believe SMS is a significant change to the current gold standard in aircraft certification, parts of the program are incomplete, some of it is Illegal, and it might ultimately lead to a decreasing margin of safety in our national airspace system.
Starting as early as next week, the agency will start formal meetings with our engineers and members. We have asked our folks to attend, ask questions, and take detailed notes on the agency's plans. So far the agency's briefings have been part road show, part medicine man and part intimidation. They want our people to shut up and take the Nike way out---"Just Do It." That's not going to fly for us. NATCA is urging employees to use their voices to point out the pitfalls and problems associated with SMS.
We are beginning our formal response to SMS. NATCA's initial reaction to SMS is that SMS will abdicate our ability to oversee aviation manufacturers, and it will erode our ability to oversee aviation safety designees, as well. Just recently, the FAA granted Boeing the ability to DOA-approve "new TC" aircraft. We feel this is absurd and illegal. Our engineers think the regulations do not support this warped interpretation, and they have memorialized this with the agency. We are creating a robust paper trail which we hope never gets seen, unlike the paper trail which eventually became the CAIB.
NATCA is constantly looking for input not only on SMS, but on how we can improve the current safety system. Our current system has delivered the lowest accident rate. Our current system is not broken nor does it need to be scrapped. We know that our engineers and their co-workers toil daily to keep the flying public safe. I humbly thank them for their dedication and service. I know the work they do today and every day keeps the system safe, and I know our members know what it takes to do the job right. It is dissapointing to see the agency working to throw that all away.
Here is a listing of the detailed questions we asked at a recent SMS Briefing given by management, and the evasive, incomplete and uncertain answers received to these critical, safety-related questions:
SMS-initial briefing-NATCA questions and Agency responses 4/7/06
Slide 1 “AIR Safety Management System Overview”
NATCA Questions: - After hearing the whole presentation, we voiced concerns over the lack of any examples that would support a case for changing the current system.
- We also asked for examples of “gaps” in the current certification/safety system, so we could understand what the agency was trying to change.
- We also requested to be part of any teams put together to develop changes in our working environment.
Agency response: …had no response, questions were too detailed, no orders/policies/regs have been identified yet…
Slide 3 “What Is Our Job?”
NATCA Questions: - We voiced concerns that the agency had failed to denote the key day-to-day functions of certification, findings of compliance, accident and service difficulty investigations, Airworthiness Directives, etc…Why?
-We asked the agency to clarify what “risks” were they trying to mitigate?
Agency response: …had no response, questions were too detailed, no orders/policies/regs have been identified yet…
Slide 4 “AIR SMS Vision”
NATCA Questions: - “Systems Approach”?? Don’t we already have that today via FARs, Orders, Policies, etc.?
-When did management drop the ball on these safety items?
Agency response: …had no response, questions were too detailed, no orders/policies/regs have been identified yet…
Slide 5 “How Does Safety Management Help Us Improve?”
NATCA Questions: - What safety management are they referring to?
-Understand what “risk” better? What don’t we understand now that management is concerned about?
-Why aren’t there any specific items discussed?
Agency response: …had no response, questions were too detailed, no orders/policies/regs have been identified yet…
Slide 7 “What does our Safety Management System Look Like?”
NATCA Questions – Is this pyramid your visions of what you are going to develop?
-NATCA doesn’t view QMS as being effectively implemented (and in some cases, it’s not been implemented). Is the agency interested in putting together a joint team with NATCA to make QMS work?
-If the safety culture is the base/foundation of the pyramid, why is the System Safety Approach going to drive “down” change? What’s wrong with our present “Safety Culture” that has created the lowest/safest aircraft accident rate in history?
Agency response: …we “need” to change the culture by driving down change to support it, no response to the fact we have the lowest/safest aircraft accident rate…basically non-answers and “this is a high level review”…
Slide 15 “What are some Attributes of a System Safety Approach?”
NATCA Questions – We are vary concerned with the terms/non-descriptive concepts of “Discretionary Authority, Risk Assessment Tools, Action Validation, and Risk-based Approach”. When will these be defined?
Agency response:…no orders or policies have been changed to address these, “this is a high level review”…
Slide 18 compared to Slide 19 (aka “Current System” vs “Future AIR System”)
These questions & responses were for the “Current System”:
NATCA Questions – What examples of “gaps” can be provided?
- Where are the “Industry gaps” like failure to provide data, inadequate data, “last minute” notification of changes in type design during a certification program, etc…
Agency response: …a gap can be like when there might have been a certification standard developed that didn’t also address operations
…this slide is only looking at the FAA/internal view
These questions & responses were for the “Future AIR System”:
NATCA Questions – Where are the pictorial representations of “Data & Info” like there were in the current system?
Agency response: …hopefully this system will allow us/FAA to look at more data…
Slide 22 “1. Standards in the SMS”
NATCA Questions – “Focus”? What aren’t we doing today?
- Will this take away from the engineer’s ability today to question any area of concern?
- Where are the details on what are the “highest risk areas”?
- When have we not facilitated the implementation of new technologies to advance safety?
Agency response: …”this is a high level of review”…
Slide 23 “2. Certification in the SMS”
– The agency verbally described an applicant’s system as requiring a “design” system. We/NATCA clarified that there is no law that mandates the need for a design system, so it would be illegal to mandate this. The agency verbally stated they needed to review this with Legal.
- We noted that several organizational delegations currently have engineering systems that we oversee. The agency verbally stated that the “design” system is different than a delegation’s system.
- “Pre-Qualification requirements?” We clarified that this would be illegal to implement since the current law does not mandate this. It is also “anti-free market.” This will negatively hinder a majority of new, small, and mid-size aviation businesses.
Slide 24 “Example of Changes in Certification”
NATCA : We commented that all the examples under the column heading “Future with SMS” will be huge/significant changes in our current working environment and responsibilities
Agency response: …no specifics have been developed yet…
Slide 25 “3. Continued Operational Safety in the SMS”
NATCA Question: What are “Standardized risk management methodologies”?
Agency response: …some early work has been done by Directorates, but nothing worth discussing/integrating…no processes have been developed…
Slide 26 “4. Production in the SMS”
NATCA Questions: - What specifically needs to be “improved” concerning Engineering and Manufacturing working together? Certification Management is an inherently manufacturing function.
-NATCA is opposed to any system/process/procedure that prevents us from looking at type design
Agency response: ……had no response, questions were too detailed…
Slide 27 “5. Delegation Decisions in the SMS”
NATCA – Allowing “Applicant Showing Only” Is Illegal!!
Agency response: …they are looking into that…
Slide 28 “ 6. Use of CFR Prioritization in Delegation”
This has three areas of discussion:
Cube diagram under heading of “Today”
-The agency clarified that there is NO Applicant Showing today. The line was to split the cube into two sections identified as “FAA Finding” vs “Delegated with FAA ad hoc review of data”
Cube diagram under headings of “Tomorrow” and “SMS”
-The two lines split the cube into three sections. The lowest section in the cube had no description. We/NATCA questioned if this was a “gap”. The agency identified it as a “some data would be allowed to be approved as Applicant Showing Only.” We reminded them that is Illegal.
Cube diagram under headings of “Tomorrow” and “CDO (with SMS)”
-The CDO is part of FAA Reauthorization and the law states that the FAA is to show a plan to Congress in 2007 and is to be implemented in 2008. The agency said that there is discussion for this to be pushed back.
-We questioned if the term “showing” meant that the applicant would actually do any certification work.
-The agency said that the FAA should be allowed to audit records. We felt this was reactive and that the FAA may only be allowed to do this only after an accident…we felt their interpretation puts the public at risk
Slide 30 “8. Designee Management in the SMS”
-NATCA is clearly opposed to any prioritization of CFRs and is opposed to any restrictions to the current FAA methodologies of engineering review and oversight. WE ARE OPPOSED TO ABDICATION.
-We/NATCA do not see the GAO’s findings & recommendations in regards to Designee Oversight being specifically addressed. The agency had no details of how it was addressing the GAO’s report.
Slide 32 “10. SMS and Our Work with Industry”
-We/NATCA do not see SMS going down the path of being proactive
-We reminded the agency that pre-qualification is illegal. The agency said they may be looking at Part 21 and it may not apply to all applicants---creating a two-tier system of certification and aircraft safety.